



Any argument that starts with the claim that it concerns a theory of moder-
nity is constrained to account for the nature of modernity's inception. Even
in working with the assumption of modernity's presence there would still
have to be a description of that which was located in its differentiation from
the modern. Part of the argument to be developed here is that for the ma-
jor thinkers of modernity its occurrence is thought in terms of a break or an
interruption. Here, the particular project is to locate that thinking in the writ-
ings of Walter Benjamin. A context therefore is set by those writings and the
presence within them of attempts to develop a relationship between moder-
nity and its necessary interarticulation with a philosophical conception of
historical time. Given this context, the opening question has to concern the
specificity of interruption within those writings.
How is interruption to be thought? What is the conception of interruption
at work within Benjamin's writings? Although it appears as a motif in his
engagement with Romanticism and is then repositioned - if not reworked in
the later writings in terms of a thinking of historical time - interruption as a
mode of thought within Benjamin's work can be identified under a number
of different headings. In each instance what insists is the question of what
interruption stages. In Benjamin, as will become clear, interruption is the term
through which a theory of modernity can be thought. This is not to argue
that it is identical with the conception of modernity located in Benjamin's
writings as such. Rather, it is modernity as an interruption, one that has to
be maintained and which will vanish within the resurgence of historicism
understood as the insistence of continuity in the face of discontinuity, that
marks the move from a specifically Romantic motif to a thinking of historical
time. The Romantic motif of interruption will allow for such a thinking of
historical time. The direct consequence of this is that to the extent that
this latter point is the case then a theory of modernity will owe as much
to a Romantic heritage as it will to one coming from the Enlightenment. 1
Indeed, it can be further argued that thinking the particularity of modernity
97
ANDREW BENJAMIN Benjamin's modernity
as an interruption depends upon the successful distancing of the conception
of historical time within the Enlightenment tradition.
Interruption is named in different ways. Perhaps the most emphatic, and
the one that will allow this theme to be traced here, is the "caesura." The
aim of this chapter is to develop an understanding of interruption both in
terms of the "caesura," and to note the effective presence of this specific
mode of thought within a number of different texts. Often interruption will
be named differently. Rather than attempt a synoptic exercise, two particular
moments will be taken up. The first concerns the work of the caesura in
Benjamin's essay "Goethe's Elective Affinities" and the second is the recur-
rence of the term in Convolute N of the Arcades Project (Arcades, 475;
xr oa, 3). In regard to Benjamin's own chronology these texts mark the be-
ginning and the end of his writing career. While Benjamin writes both his
doctoral dissertarion and his essay on Holderlin prior to the Goethe essay,
the latter can be seen as the point of departure both for his development
of the concept of criticism developed in the dissertation and his sustained
engagement with the Romantic heritage. The Arcades Project; while not fin-
ished in a literal sense, always brought with it the possibility of never heing
finished. As such it was the work that truly marked the end of Benjamin's
writings.
In the symbol of the star, the hope that Goethe had to conceive for the [overs
had once appeared to him. That sentence, which so to speak with Hiilderlin
contains the caesura of the work and in which, while the embracing lovers
seal their fate, everything pauses, reads: "Hope shot across the sky above their
heads like a falling star." They are unaware of it, of course ...
("Goethe," SWI,I54-55)
of the symbol that departs both from the simultaneity of the relation between
symbol and the symbolized, and equally from the hermeneutic demands of
surface/depth as the setup through which the symbol is constrained to be
interpreted. The opening up of the symbol occurs within what could be
described as a destruction entailing ontological and temporal considerations.
Destruction figures in the Goethe essay in a number of different places. One
of the more significant is in terms of the "torso."
Benjamin refers both in the Goethe essay and in the doctoral dissertation
to the "torso." In the case of the dissertation the term is used to argue that
the particular "can never coalesce with the Ideal" but has to remain "als
Vorhild" ("as a prototype"). In the Goethe essay the symbol is also linked to
the "torso. " It is presented in relation to the work of "the expressionless."
Benjamin writes: "Only the expressionless completes the work by shattering
it into a thing of shards, into a fragment of the true world, into a torso
of a symbol" ("Goethe," SW 1,34°). What is a "torso of a symbol"? The
first part of the answer to this question is that it is a result; the consequence
of the work of the "expressionless." The work is completed in its being
fragmented. The mistake would be to read this as a literal claim. There
a re not any shards; there will not have been any fragments. Rather that
moment (and it is a moment, Benjamin writes in einem Augenblick) is that
in which the most severe form of irreconcilability occurs. The torso of a
symbol, however, is not given within the structure of necessity demanded
by diremption since it does not envisage its own overcoming or resolution.
Rather, it is the staging of an opening that can only ever be maintained as
this opening. Being mainrained in this manner it defines a predicament in
which the problem of closure and thus resolution is staged without an end
being envisaged.
What then of the "torso" in this predicament? As a torso the symbol
has been stripped of the structure and thus of the possibility of temporal
simultaneity: nonetheless this cannot be interpreted as opening up a field of
infinite deferral. The work is still completed. The expressionless completes.
Again the text is clear, Benjamin states, "uollendet das Werk" ("completes
the work"). It is completed by the occurrence within it that is the work of a
temporal register that cannot be assimilated to the temporality of expression.
This means that what completes the work is integral to the work's formal
presence and not to the "content" of its narrative. The "expressionless" is
not the interruption of continuity nor is it simple discontinuity. It completes
the work by showing, on the one hand, the perpetual vacuity of expression
if expression were thought to voice the all, and, on the other, by demanding
of the work that it recall- recall within and as its work - its separation from
the eternal. While more needs to be said, the introduction of time allows the
Almost at the end of Benjamin's extraordinary study of Goethe's novel, he
writes that a particular sentence contains what he describes as the "caesura
of the work." Analyzing this claim will open up the way the caesura is staged
in his early writings. The passage in question is the following:
The presence of the star cannot be divorced from its presence as a symhol.
The text is clear, "Denn unter dem Symbol des Sterns" ("In the symbol
of a star"). Introduced with the symbol is the split that works within the
caesura and which is registered in the lover's non-registration of the star -
as the symbol of hope. Understanding that split means paying attention to
the complex relationship between time and the Absolute as it figures in the
symbol insofar as the symbol is evidenced in this passage. (At this stage
in Benjamin's development he is yet to formulate a sustained distinction
between symbol and allegory.) Benjamin has allowed here for a conception
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problem of the nature of the caesura, and in this context its relation to hope,
to be staged. In the passage already noted the caesura enters with a particular
purpose. The expressionless understood as "a category of language and art"-
though not of a work or genre - "can be no more rigorously defined than
through a passage from Holder/in's 'Remarks on Oedipus'" ("Goethe" SW I,
340) to which Benjamin adds that the deployment of the caesura beyond its
use in a theory of tragedy has not been noticed, let alone pursued with
adequate rigor.
Two points therefore. The first is that the caesura allows for a rigorous
definition of the expressionless. Secondly, the caesura is to be used other
than in its employment within a theory of tragedy. The caesura is precisely
not an emblem of rhetoric. On one level the caesura and the expression-
less are different names for the same possibility, namely an interruption that
yields completion. It is this possibility that needs to be pursued by a re-
turn to the passage in which the completion of Goethe's novel is identified
as occurring in a single sentence. How could it he that a sentence might
"contain the caesura of the work"? What is shattered in this case? Where
are the shards? Here there are no twitching limbs vainly gesturing at what
remains, i.e., to the torso. How then is this claim to be understood? More-
over, the passage in which this phrase - "which will complete the work" -
is presented, does not occur at its completion. It may set the seal for what
will occur, and yet it occurs pages from the end. How then does it work
to complete the work? For Benjamin this has to be the question proper to
criticism if only because the answer would "provide detailed knowledge of
the work."
It is essential therefore to return to one of Benjamin's formulations of
criticism. Only with an understanding of criticism will it become possible
to follow the role attributed to the caesura in the Goethe essay. The essay
is, after all, a work of "criticism." The passage in question moves criticism
through a number of vital stages. While the passage is detailed - containing
in addition an important reference to Schlegel's own criticism of Goethe's
Wilhelm Meister - its detail is essential:
The legitimization of criticism - which is not to posit criticism as an objective
court of judgment on all poetic production - consists in its prosaic nature.
Criticism is the preparation of the prosaic kernel in every work. In this, the
concept preparation is understood in the chemical sense, as the generation of
a substance through a determinate procedure to which other substances are
submitted. This is what Schlegelmeans when he says of Wilhelm Meister: "the
work not only judges itself it prepares itself." The prosaic isgrasped bycriticism
in both of its meanings: in its literal meaning through the form of expression, as
criticism expresses itself in prose; in its figurative meaning through criticism's
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object, which is the eternal sober continuance of the work. This criticism, as
process and as product, is a necessary function of the classical work.
(Concept of Criticism, SW 1,153)
Criticism is that approach to the work in which the identification of its par-
ticularity allows for its incorporation into what Romanticism would have
identified as "the realm of the Absolute." The move, in the most direct
sense, would be from the "prosaic kernel" to the prose of criticism. The
extent to which a work is criticizable is the extent to which it prepares it-
self (is prepared) for this possibility. The complicating factor in the passage
is how the distinction between the "literal" and the "figural" is to be un-
derstood. For Benjamin "prosaic" has two meanings. The first refers to its
presence defined within the context of the passage as "unrnetrical language."
The prosaic expressed in the prose of criticism. However, the prosaic is
also "grasped by criticism in a figurative sense" as "the eternal continua-
tion of the work." What that means is that criticism holds to particularity
while, at the same time, allowing for the particular's absorption into the
Ahsolute.
Criticism is able to allow for the completion of the particular work to the
extent that the work is criticizable. As it is formulated in the Goethe essay
this signals the presence of the possibility of showing "in the work of art the
virtual possibility of formulating the work's truth content" as the "highest
philosophical problem." The latter is, of course, the staging of the Absolute
and its impossible possibility. The moment that brings this together is the
caesura. As has already been intimated, the first reference in Benjamin's text
to this term that is worth noting concerns his identification of the caesura as
it figures in Holderlin's Remarks. It is important to return to the actual text
he cites. The Holderlin text, as cited by Benjamin is as follows:
For the tragic transport is the actually empty and the least restrained. - Thereby
in the rhythmic sequence of the representations wherein the transport presents
itself, there becomes necessary what in the poetic metre is called caesura, the
pure world, the counter rhythmic rupture - namely, in order to meet the on-
rushing change of representations at its highest point, in such a manner that
not the change of representation but the representation itself soon appears.
("Goethe," SWI, 340-1)
Holderliri's formulation is more complex than suggesting a form of inter-
ruption that would only ever be a counter-rhythm. Metre does not mea-
-ure the interruption. That would make the caesura a literal breaking apart.
Rather, such a rupture must take place on the level of representation and pre-
sentation. The site of interruption is the "sequence of the representations"
and their movement is that of the "onrushing change of representations."
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The sequence and the movement produce the site of interruption. This se-
quence cannot be straightforwardly conflated with plot. Sequence and move-
ment need to be viewed in temporal terms. They involve a particular form
of unfolding; one which articulates a sequential temporality. The caesura
is positioned by place - insofar as it can be located - while it is not the
work of place. Thus, it is not another occurrence. The complicating factor
here is that interruption is both the interruption of a certain temporal se-
quence, and equally the interruption of the possibility of reading that se-
quence as the unfolding of the purely transcendental. In other words, the
work is neither regulated nor caused by that which is external to it. The
former element is the one that comes to dominate Benjamin's later writ-
ings. Nonetheless, the other element is important as what is refused by it
is the possibility of an eternal other, either as God, idea, or myth, to pro-
vide the artwork with its legitimacy and, though this is probably to reiterate
the impossibility of legitimacy, to offer the locus and thus determine the
nature of critique. Critique is not a relation between an external element
and internal components that causes these components to receive a specific
determination.
What remains elusive in this presentation of the caesura - and here it
cannot be restricted to the caesura since it involves the other forms of inter-
ruption- is how such an event can "give free reign to an expressionless power
inside all artistic media." The answer to this question is there in the almost
possible object of attainment identified by the use of the term "sobriety."
It marks the point of connection between measure and the measureless. As
such it is the return of the problem of particularity. This time, however, it is
posed in a different way. Rather than the particular, it is the Absolute that has
centrality. Absolute here is marked by an impossible possibility. At the same
time it is also generative. However, despite being productive, the Absolute
cannot be produced. It can be neither made nor shown. Read back though
the caesura - and while not wishing, again, to conflate them - it marks the
interruption that yields an artwork. It presents that which is proper to art.
This is the "expressionless power inside all artistic media"; i.e., the Absolute.
The Absolute, the nature of its presence, already turning within semblance
cannot be reduced to that to which "mere semblance" gestures.
How is semblance to be delimited? In a discussion of "Goethean figures"
and thus as an integral part of the work's critique, Benjamin, drawing on the
critical apparatus he had already established, writes of those figures:
semblance. For semblance in this poetic work is not so much represented as it
is in the poetic representation itself. It is only for this reason that the semblance
can mean so much; and only for this reason that the representation means so
much. ("Goethe," SWI, 345)
[They] can appear to be not created or purely constructed but conjured. Pre-
cisely from this stems the kind of obscurity that is foreign to works of art
and that can be fathomed only by someone who recognizes its essence in
At work in this formulation is that which arises from the operation of cri-
tique. In the first instance, there is an appearance of figures having one source
rather than another. Here, again, the detail is necessary. The formulation is
precise. Goethean figures "can appear" to have arisen through an act of
conjuring and if that were then the case the critique of conjuring as "having
nothing in common" ("Goethe," SW I, 340) with the generation of art would
have been rendered otiose. The problem of this appearing is the problem in-
herent in the work. Its presence attests to the necessity of critique, and thus
to critique as an activity done in relation to a work that sanctions it. Rather
than taking what appears as appearance, in the end mere appearance, the
reverse situation needs to occur. There has to be the recognition of what
is essential to art in the semblance; the "Wesen" in the "Schein." With the
Elective Affinities, and it should be noted that Benjamin specifies that, in this
work, there is not a "presentation of semblance," it is the presentation itself.
This is the reason why semblance can have the meaning that it does and,
reciprocally, this is why the presentation itself is imbued with such meaning.
Again, it is essential to see what is being distanced. Not only is there a sus-
tained refusal to interpret appearance as representational and therefore as
standing for something other than itself, there is also a distancing of the pos-
sibility that semblance acts out what it can only gesture at in action without
being such an action.
Understanding the import of this claim concerning the presence of sern-
blance depends upon accepting Benjamin's identification of the two elements
that determine the interpretation. The first is that "the subject of The Elective
Affinities is not marriage," and the second is that "belief in Ottilie's beauty
is the fundamental condition for engagement with the novel" ("Goethe,"
SW I, 338). This is not "the appearance of the beautiful," rather it is the
"semblance-like beauty" that is central. This shift has to be recognized as
a move from content to truth, that is, from a concern with the "material
content" to a concern with "truth content." It is not as though marriage and
the concerns of bourgeois gentility are absent. Rather they only figure within
the work of truth. Before pursuing this move to semblance and thus to the
complexity surrounding semblance, it is essential to note that the emergence
of beauty occurs as part of the process of critique. Underlining the irnpor-
ranee of this shift is not, therefore, a mere passing remark. It delineates how
Benjamin's essay is also a work of critique.
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Once critique is linked to an engagement with truth rather than con-
tent, then content has to be repositioned in relation to truth. The detail of .
Benjamin's engagement with the constitutive elements of the novel is, though
only in this instance, not necessary. What has to be retained however is the
direction of that engagement. Benjamin's move is to reposition semblance
and thus give it its full philosophical force. Semblance opens up the realm of
the Absolute and the relationship between the particular and the Absolute
once it is understood that semblance stages both itself and the Absolute. (The
presence of the latter is to be thought in terms of the impossible possibility of
the Absolute's presence.) Precision is essential here. Benjamin's claim is that
critique works within the opening between particular and Absolute. It needs
both elements - particular/Absolute - since the interrelationship of these el-
ements comprises the work of art. This is why in regard to the treatment of
beauty in Goethe's novel, in which beauty becomes "the object in its veil,"
Benjamin will write that:
that what the caesura allows is the relationship between the particular and
the Absolute to be thought. In doing this the artful nature of the artwork
is presented. Criticism in the context cannot be thought other than in its
relationship to the work of the Absolute. The complex presence of the Ab-
solute and the way it figures within, if not providing the very ground of,
Benjamin's engagement with Early Romanticism, opens up the move to his
later concerns with history. That concern is not with the detail of history -
Rankean "facts" - but with the temporality that such facts display and within
which such facts are able to be displayed. History cannot be thought other
than as a philosophy of time.
The task of criticism is not to lift the veil but rather, through the most precise
knowledge of it as a veil, to raise itself for the first time to the true view of the
beautiful. To the view that will never open itself up to so-called empathy and
will only imperfectly open itself to a purer contemplation of the naive: to the
view of the beautiful of that which is secret. Never yet has a true work of art
been grasped other than when it ineluctably represented itself as a secret.
("Goethe," SW 1,35')
In moving from a concern with CrItICIsm to the concerns of Benjamin's
Arcades Project the difficulty any commentator faces is how to account for
the repositioning. Perhaps the key interpretive question is: is there a reten-
tion of the Romantic conception of the Absolute? (In sum, a conception in
which a particular work is both itself and the Absolute at the same time.)
Prior to any attempt to answer this question, what has to be addressed is the
move from interruption in the writings directly concerned with Romanticism
to a more generalized sense of interruption. Prior to turning to the passage
from the Arcades Project in which the term "caesura" figures, two specific
formulations of interruption need to be noted. The first comes from "The
Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility" and the second
from "On the Concept of History."
As a text, Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Techno-
logical Reproducibility" is full of remarkable moments, shock insights that
attest to the interruption that yields the work of art within modernity. One
of the most emphatic occu rs in the following passage:
The opening line contains the key to this passage. There would seem to be a
twofold possibility. The first links criticism to the process of revelation and
thus the uncovering of an inner truth. This is precluded since criticism is not
concerned with lifting the veil. In the same way a fetishism of the veil gen-
erating an interpretive mysticism would still attribute to the veil the quality
of harboring depth. This would imply that the veil is literally the veil. Both
these possibilities are curtailed since criticism is already informed. Benjamin
is clear: the veil is known. It is an object of knowledge. Intuition or empathy
would fail to interrupt the work of the infinite. Knowledge rehearses the pet-
rification of the object: the object of knowledge. Knowledge does not provide
access to the secret. Knowledge is knowledge of the artwork as the secret.
Knowledge maintains the secret, though as known. The limit is established
by the effective nature of the Absolute. While accounting for presence - and
allowing for its present incorporation as part of the particular's presence -
it can never be present as itself.
If there is a way of generalizing what is at work in the complex relation-
ship between interruption and criticism, then it can be captured in the claim
Let us assume that an actor is supposed to be startled by a knock at the door.
If his reaction is not satisfactory, the director can resort to an expedient: he
could have a shot fired without warning behind the actor's back on some other
occasion when he happens to be in the studio. The actor's frightened reaction
at that moment could be recorded and then edited into the film.Nothing shows
more graphically that art has escaped the realm of the "beautiful semblance"
which for so long was regarded as the only sphere in which it could thrive.
(SW IV, 261)
What is this "beautiful semblance" where art was thought to "thrive," and in
which it can "thrive" no longer? What type of change has occurred such that
this dislocation and thus subsequent relocation comes to pass? The reference
made in this 1936 text is both to the Early Romantics (and thus to Benjamin's
own engagement with that heritage) and to a sustained engagement with the
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topic of beauty that reappears throughout his work. A significant instance
of that engagement is the long footnote on beauty in the essay "On Some
Motifs in Baudelaire" (SW IV, 352). This footnote signals a historicization
of beauty that was not as evident in his earlier writings. As has already been
intimated, the most sustained discussion of beauty as "beautiful semblance"
appears in the final section of his essay "Goethe's Elective Affinities." In
the final pages of that text Benjamin introduces - perhaps reintroduces -
the task of criticism in relation to beauty. This relation is central. All of
Benjamin's work on art has been concerned with detailing the task of crit-
icism. Criticism is the key to the doctoral dissertation. Indeed the complex
relationship between philosophy and criticism is evident in the opening line
of the Preface to The Origin of the German Tragic Drama (Origin, 27-56).
In the published version there is an important modification of the earlier
drafts. The change introduces the problem of philosophical style by inscrib-
ing the problem of presentation into the presentation of philosophy itself.
The first passage is from the draft and the second is from the published
version.
Es isr der philosophischen Erkenntnis eigen, mit jeder Wendung von neuem
vor der Frage der Darstellung zu stehen.
[It is characteristic of philosophical knowledge that it must continually con-
front the question of presentation.] (GS, III, 840)
Es isr der philosophischen Schrifttum eigen, mit jeder Wendung von neuem vor
der Frage der Darstellung zu stehen,
[It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually confront
the question of presenrarion.] (Origin, 28; emphasis mine)
suggesting is not that the Absolute no longer figures in how the work of art
is to be understood, but that the locus of art and thus what counts as art's
work has changed. The move from the identification of art with poetry -
or at least if not with poetry then with literature in the broadest sense
of the term - and thus the capacity to generalize about art based on that
identification, has ceded its place to a definition of art in terms of what pro-
duces it. In regard to the work of art, what is occurring can be reformulated
as a move from poesis to techne. Even in allowing for this reformulation
the question that returns is the extent to which such a move rids itself of
the Absolute. And yet this question cannot be posed as though the answer
were all or nothing. It is more likely the case that in the move from one to
the other - poesis to techne - the Absolute rather than vanishing comes to be
redefined. While art will continue to be defined via the activity of criticism,
understood either implicitly or explicitly, in relation to the Absolute, the shift
of the content of that definition will yield a differing understanding of the
Absolute.'
As a generalization, the contrast is between two different possibilities for
art and criticism. The nature of that difference is to be understood in terms of
the relationship between time and the object. Poesis involves a different re-
lationship than the one at work in art defined as techne. Indeed, it is because
the relationship is formulated in this way that the temporal considerations
at work in the latter - the conception of the work of art determined by
techne - are such that they open up as historical concerns; not the concerns
of history as such but in terms of the temporality proper to that conception
of history that is constrained to undo the identification of history with the
temporality of historicism. (The latter being the temporality of continuity
that is sustained either in terms of simple chronology or in terms of the en-
durance through time of concepts - for example: beauty, genius - that are
taken never to change.) Both the need for, as well as another sense of inter-
ruption, occur at this precise point. Prior to looking at passages from "On
the Concept of History" and the Arcades Project in which the conception
of interruption figures - and in the case of the latter is identified by the use
of the term "caesura" - it is essential to note, if only in passing, the nature of
the shift.
What determines Benjamin's initial sense of interruption is the necessity
that the activity be internal to the work. The work "prepared" itself to be
criticized. There is an extent to which the work has an autotelic nature.
The link between the work of the "expressionless" and the activity of crit-
icism - both are involved in differing forms of the work's ruination - is
that they are defined in relation to an activity that originates in the place
and presence of the Absolute. Once a work can be construed as criticizable
While the shift from knowledge to writing is of great significance ill terms of
the development of Benjamin's text, what is interesting for these concerns is
that writing becomes a practice stemming from a particular formulation of
philosophical activity. The initial use of the term "knowledge" (Erkenntnis)
creates the link to criticism, for it is at the end of the Goethe essay that
criticism and knowledge are interconnected. What is important in the move
from Benjamin's early texts to the later ones is that the conception of art
is inextricably bound up with the task of criticism once criticism is defined
in relation to knowledge. A shift in the nature of art enjoins a concomitant
shift in the activity of criticism and thus of the philosophy of art. While that
shift occurs, what is not lost is the link to knowledge.
Does this mean, however, that the shift from the "realm of beautiful sem-
blance" detailed in the passage cited above is at the same time a move away
from a thinking of art conditioned by the Absolute? Drawing such a con-
clusion would be roo hasty. Clearly, what Benjamin can be interpreted as
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then there is little that stands in the way of the practice of cnncrsm,
While it is true that Benjamin has harsh words to say concerning Gundolf's
interpretation of Goethe and, while there is a growing awareness of the po-
litical nature of criticism, it remains the case that there was no theorization
of that which stood in the way of the activity of criticism. In other words,
it was not the case in the early writings that there was any recognition of
the need for a preliminary move, one which would allow for criticism. Such
a move is not preliminary in the sense that it is prior to the activity of crit-
icism. Rather, criticism means dealing both with the way in which a ,given
work of art worked as a work of art while also stripping that work of its
insertion into the temporality of continuity - what Benjamin identifies as
"historicism" - and thus disrupting the structures that accompanied that
hold.
Two points need to be made here. The first is that what the identification
of the possibility of inserting, or cutting, a segment into a work - a possibility
signaled in the citation from "The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological
Reproducibility" given above - indicates is that there is a shift in how the art
object is understood. Part of the change is that the way the work of art works
as criticizable changes. The second and related point is that the possibility of
the work's absorption into the temporality of continuity is now a possibility
that is inherent in the work itself. In the shift from poesis to techne the work
of art does not prepare itself to be identified as something particular. In the
move from poesis something else takes place. Henceforth, the work of art is
always prepared for its absorption into the realm of continuity. As has been
indicated, what this means is that the activity of criticism - and perhaps it is
possible to go further and argue that this is the task of the progressive critic-
necessitates the interruption of that enforcing continuity; an enforcing that
is inherent in the technical nature of the object.
Benjamin identifies the problem of historicism - understood as the tem-
porality of sequential continuity - in the following passage from "On the
Concept of History." Of central importance in this passage is the use of the
imagery of the rosary beads. It provides a clear example of the way con-
tinuity has to be interrupted in order that the potential within and for art
be released. Of equal importance is that instead of writing about the critic
Benjamin will now write of the "historian." The passage in question is the
following:
his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a
rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with
a definite earlier one. Thus he estahlishes a conception of the present as the
"time of the now" which is shot through with chips of Messianic time.
(Ill, 2.63)
Historicism contents itself with establishing a casual connection between var-
ious moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason
historical. It becomes historical, posthumously, as it were, through events that
may be separated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as
A beginning can be made here with the interruption signaled by the use of
the rosary. The question has to be - what does it mean to "stop telling the
sequence of events"? Here, there is a decisive formulation of interruption.
And yet within the formulation what is interrupted has a more complex
quality. It is the projection of unity or synthesis - or what Benjamin will
identify elsewhere as "universal history" having Kant rather than Hegel in
mind - that has to be undone. No longer is this destructive move made in
the name of anything other than an intervention within temporal continuity.
Precisely because it is an interruption that involves a specific orientation that
can be as much philosophical as it is artistic, the demands of that orientation,
itself demanding a decision, allow what is taking place here to be described
as a politics of time.!
Interruption as a figure within Benjamin's writings is linked to the domi-
nance of historicism. Again, this is not a simple concept of the historical and
thus of historical time. What takes place within historicism is the natural-
ization of chronology, on the one hand, and the naturalization of myth, on
the other. Working within both is a continuity that effaces the question of
whose history is being told or narrated and thus for whom and for what end
a given history is being constructed. The act that denaturalizes both myth
and chronology is the interruption. The immediate consequence of this in-
terruption is the reconfiguring of the present. With that reconfiguration the
present emerges as the "now" - a temporalized and historicized now - that
generates the nature of the philosophical and therefore, and at the same
time, the political task." What this means is that in Benjamin's later writings
a twofold register is added to the locus of interruption. In the case of the
earlier work, the locus was the work of art itself. Marking the move is the
incorporation of the work of art into a time of the present in which whatever
determines the work's specificity can be effaced. Effacing specificity occurs
because what marks the work is its capacity to interrupt the time of the
present. This interruption occurs as long as the temporality of the present
is thought in terms of continuity. What this means, in addition, is that the
present is not thought outside its insertion into continuity. This accounts for
why Benjamin argues for the urgency of making something a concern for
the present. If this does not occur, then the present does no more than form
part of the "appearance of permanence" (Arcades, 486; NI9, 1).5 As such
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the present is lost fro III the present. Thinking the present is already an inter-
ruption; an interruption yielding the present.
The interruption occurs when the historian stops "telling the sequence
of events like the beads of a rosary." Here, there is a decision that inter-
rupts. This position is made possible by a shift that can be traced from
the work of the art defined in terms of "beautiful semblance" to the
art work's inescapable connection to reproducibility and thus to technol-
ogy. The methodological consequences of this interruption redefine how
destruction and therefore ruination are to be understood. This other pos-
sibility is signaled in the Arcades Project as follows: "Hisroricai marcrialism
has to abandon the epic element in history. It blasts the epoch out of the rei-
fied 'continuity of history.' It also blasts open the homogeneity of rhe epoch.
It saturates it with ecrasite, i.e. the present (Gegenwart)" iArcadcs, 474;
N9a,6 [trans. modifiedj). Signaled in this passage is the decision to abandon
continuity. That abandoning allows for, and at the same time, is the open-
ing up of the epoch's homogeneity. What is meant by epoch is rescued and
transformed in the process. The blasting open allows the fallout to contain
the elements of historical work. The position being staged here needs to be
run both ways. In the first instance it has to be argued that in the detritus
of history - what has been cast out of epic history - there lies rhe potential
to interrupt continuity. Continuity may have been founded on just such an
elimination. In the second, it is by blasting apart continuity that what looks
to be insignificant, or merely awaits incorporation into a form of continuity
or totality, may contain the potential to redefine the present and, more sig-
nificantly, to have consequences that are potentially as much political as they
are philosophical or historical. Occurring in this process is an acr of rescue
in which images of the past have a capacity to define the present. The rescue
is the release - 0[' attempted release - of that potential. In defining it - and
again it should be remembered that such an act of definition is the result of
a decision - the present comes to be established in contradistinction to the
present of continuity. In the formulation of "On the Concept of History,"
"every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its
own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably" (Ill, 255). \X'hile it is clear
that the methodological import of this procedure involves what it i, premised
on and the different conception of interruption and destruction it involves,
what endures as the open question is the relationship all of this has to the
Absolute, even if it is a reworked, perhaps even reconfigured, conception
of the Absolute. Does this other history of destruction entail the effective
presence of the Absolute? This is a question that cannot be ignored.
The passage from the Arcades Project that opens up the interruption de-
manded by the caesura and which will allow for the question of the Absolute
to hegin to be posed is the following. It should be remembered that bring-
ing the Absolute into focus is not to acid on an extra element. Criticism, as
noted already, is unthinkable except in relation to the Absolute. The obvious
question is: does this remain the case given the already noted move from the
criticism to the historian? Were critics, and therefore criticism, a form of
historical materialism auant fa lettre:
Thinking involves both thoughts in motions and thoughts at rest. When think-
ing reaches a standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions, the dialectical
image appears. This image is the c.icsur.i in the movement of thought. Its locus
[s of course not arhitrary. In short it is to he found wherever the tension be-
tween dialectical oppositions IS greate-st. The dialectical image is, accordingly,
the very object constructed in the materialist presentation of history. It is iden-
tical with the historical object; it justifies its heing blasted OUtof the continuum
of the hisrorical process. (Arcades, 47S; Nloa, .1 [trans. modifiedl)
The significance of this passage is twofold. Not only does it reinforce the
interconnection between interruption and the historical object, there are
.ilso intimations of how a reworked conception of the Absolute can emerge.
(These intimations will need to be connected to another passage from the
sa me Convolute [4110; N2.3J in which the nature of "historical understand-
ing" is redefined in temporal terrns.) Despite being interrelated each of these
moments needs to he treated in turn.
The "dialectical image" is an interruption. As a dialectical image rather
than as a simple image it involves the co-presence of what can neither be
reconciled nor rendered synthetic. The image becomes a type of temporal
montage and therefore should not he understood within the conventions of
the image. Those conventions will always privilege sight over language. The
"tensions" inherent in the image are there precisely because of the irnpos-
vihiliry of the image's incorporation into the temporality of historicism or
into the procession of concepts .md activities that are articulated within that
temporal unfolding. This image is described as "the caesura in the move-
ment of thought." What does this mean? Any answer to this question has
to begin with the recognition that, for Benjamin, the dialectical image is the
true historical object. Even though that will be a contested asserrion.jr is the
ineliminahiliry of the conflict that directly confirms the impossibility of with-
drawing the historical object from questions concerning for whom, and in
whose name, a given history is heing formulated, Historicism will always try
and incorporate "events" into its own conception of continuity. The caesura
is the interruption of that attempt. What that interruption demonstrates is
that destruction reconfigures both the historical object and what can count as
historical. In the same process, it indicates that continuity (whether it be in
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terms of the naturalization of chronology or the incorporation of myth into
and as history) is always a secondary effect whose primary intent is the elimi-
nation of conflict - even if that elimination is only ever putative. Chronology,
myth, and nature would be terms deployed within the desire for what is al-
ways the same. The claim here is that not only does the "caesura" overcome
that possibility, it also shows the "always the same" to be a politically
charged aspiration and not one that contains the truth of time. In other
words, the caesura, in overcoming all that which is entailed by continuity,
achieves this end by staging the truth of time. It is precisely this staging that
opens up the Absolute."
Truth is not being counterposed to appearance. Even though continuity
is an appearance and even though the truth of time emerges with the inter-
ruption of that appearance, there are two additional points that need to be
noted. The first is that the move from poesis to techne allows for the presen-
tation of time in this way since reproducibility is already implicated in the
reconfiguring of time. Second, the reason why there is no straightforward
opposition between truth and appearance is that there is no presentation of
truth that has the same status as any given narrative of continuity. There is
no narrative of truth. There are only moments of interruption. These mo-
ments are fleeting; appearing and disappearing as sites of philosophical and
political activity.
There will be no final summation. And this lack of finality is not the
identification of the Absolute with a domain of unfettered freedom. How
then, in this context, will the Absolute figure?
The answer to this question should now be clear. The Absolute is time.
Neither chronological time nor clock time, the Absolute is given within the
interruption in which the truth of time is presented. Interruption is only pos-
sible because what can be known and therefore what functions as the ground
of what can be known are not identical with what appears. Knowing what
appears, allowing it to be reconfigured as an object of knowledge, neces-
sitates understanding appearance as an effect. There is the inevitability of
interruption. It is connected to the way Benjamin defines "historical under-
standing" as what is "to be viewed primarily as an afterlife (Nachleben) of
that which has been understood: and so what came to be recognized about
works through the analysis of their after life, theit fame, should be considered
the foundation of history itself" (Arcades, 460; N2., 3). The point being made
here is a redefinition of history. Within that redefinition history becomes the
continuity of the reworking of what is already there. This reworking is Occa-
sioned by the interruption of the given. With that interruption what is given
comes to be given again and in so doing has an "afterlife." It is, of course,
never given again as the "same." This is a process without conclusion. Or
at least it is a process whose conclusions are always strategic and provi-
sional. The Absolute is therefore that which allows for the interruption; but
equally it is what is evidenced by that interruption. There can be no attempt
to present the Absolute, nor even to state the truth of time. The Absolute as
time is what allows for the "dialectical image" while precluding any image of
time. The absence of the latter is, of course, the moment in which modernity
appears as secular.
Interruption as a defining motif in Benjamin's thought dominates both
his engagement with Romanticism and his move to the writing of another
construction of history. In both instances the interruption - analyzed in this
context in terms of the caesura - is unthinkable outside its relation to the
Absolute. In regard to Romanticism, the presence of the Absolute is expli-
cable in terms of a retention of key elements of Schlegel's philosophical and
critical project." In the case of the Arcades Project the Absolute returns as
time. Two important conclusions call be drawn from this setup. The first is
that it must force a reconsideration of the role of the Absolute within philo-
sophical thinking; even that thinking whose ostensible concern is a theory
of modernity. The second is connected insofar as what must be taken up is
the extent to which a theory of modernity will depend upon a philosophy
of time that has its point of departure in Early Romanticism, rather than in
the march of teleological time implicit, for example, in Kant's construal of
the relationship between history and the Enlightenment. In sum, interrup-
tion will continue to figure since the hold of continuity makes modernity an
unfinished project.
NOTES
I. For an important discussion of Benjamin's work that pays attention to his rela-
tionship to Romanticism see Howard Caygill, Walter Benjarnin: The Colour of
Experience (London: Routledge, (998).
2.. While not defining its presence in relation to the Absolute, Carol Jacobs indicates
the extension of "criticism" in her treatment of the relationship between criti-
cism and translation. See In the Language of Walter Benjamin (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 2.8(-)-87.
]. See Peter Osborne, Politics o( Time (London: Verso, 1997) for an important de-
. velopment of this theme that stems from a consideration of Benjamin's work.
4. I have tried to develop this argument in my Present Hope (London: Routledge,
(997)
). The full quotation is: "It could be that the continuity of tradition is only an appear-
ance. But if this is the case, then it is precisely the persistence of this appearance
of permanence that establishes continuity of appearance."
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6. This is a complex and perhaps difficult claim. The argument is, however, straight-
forward. Forms of continuity rather than heing either natural or inevitable arc
forms of time. Time is given such forms for specific ends. Interrupting such con-
cepts of time works, first to restrict the realization of those ends; second, to show
that such concepts are neither natural nor inevitable; and finally to show that time
is a site of contestation, The conflict between continuity and discontinuity is the
truth of time. Interruption, precisely because it reveals the work of construction,
stages time's truth.
7. This position has been worked out in considerable derail in my Philosophy's




Perhaps without being aware of the fact ... you find yourself ... in the
most profound agreement with Freud; there is certainly much to be
thought about in this connection.
Theodor W. Adorno, Letter to Walter Benjamin, June 1935
Psychoanalysis is a science that attempts to explain normal and pathological
states in the human mind, as well as a clinical practice of treatment for the
latter. It began with Freud's rejection of hypnosis and shock therapy as cures
for hysteria and his development with Josef Breuer of the "talking cure," a
technique of analyzing patients' free associations that was to become a cen-
tral feature of the psychoanalytic session. In Freud's account, psychoanalysis
did not truly come into its own until he began to analyze the network of as-
sociations that arise in dreams; this was the breakthrough of his first major
work, The Interpretation of Dreams. Describing dreams as the "royal road
to ... the unconscious," Freud insisted that their images arise from the inter-
action between whole systems of repressed thoughts, as a result of which no
single meaning can be affixed to any image.
Although this approach may seem reminiscent of the structuralist linguis-
tics emerging around the time Freud was writing, nothing like it had existed
before in the realm of dream interpretation. Indeed, while the idea of an
unconscious region of the mind that influences our actions most often sur-
prises readers who encounter Freud's work for the first time, it is present in
many nineteenth-century theories of psychology which influenced him. The
notion that we produce dreams as a result of the struggle berween conscious
and unconscious wishes is thus less original to Freud than his structural ap-
proach to analyzing the relations between them. In psychoanalytic theory,
this strategy shifts the relation between form and content from the individual
element onto the whole system. This, in turn, suggests an important point
of contact between psychoanalysis and early twentieth-century theories of
language and literary criticism, in particular Walter Benjamin's.
While Benjamin criticism is an ever-growing field, scholars have only re-
cently begun to pay attention to his relation to Freud or Jung. Ordinarily,
the relation between a writer (Benjamin) and a movement (psychoanaly-
sis) would be thought of as a problem of influence. Discussing Benjamin
